Pattern in Regional Labor Market Adjustment: The United States vs. Japan by Edward B. Montgomery
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
PATTERNS IN REGIONAL
LABOR MARKET ADJUSTMENT:
THE UNiTED STATES VS. JAPAN
Edward B. Montgomery
Working Paper No. 4414




The author thanks Timothy Bartik for providing his data. Katherine Abraham,
Rebecca Blank, and Andrew Oswald provided helpful comments on an earlier
draft of the paper. Anthony Blasingame and Yi-feng Chia provided research
assistance and Kari Foreback was most helpful in preparing the manuscript.
The author acknowledges financial support from the Ford Foundation and the
National Science Foundation (grant RI 1-9012706). This paper is part of
NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are those
of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4414
August 1993
PAT IERNS IN REGIONAL
LABOR MARKET ADJUSTMENT:
THE UNITED STATES VS. JAPAN
ABSTRACT
In this paper I examine regional labor market behavior in the United
States and Japan. In contrast with the picture at the aggregate level, Japanese
labor markets at the prefectural (regional) level appear to exhibit substantially
more persistence than state level labor markets in the UnitedStates. The
distribution (and positions of regions within the distribution) of wages,
unemployment, employment growth, and migration remain remarkably constant
in Japan for periods of up to 15 years. Although wages, unemployment, and
migration appear to be driven by similar factors in both countries, wages
appear to be slightly more sensitivewhile unemployment is less sensitive to
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and NBERI. Introduction
The past decade was a period in which the United States
experienced a number of cyclical and secular shocks. While the early
1980's and 1990's were periods of recession, there was sustained
growth in the mid-1980's. As seen in Table 1, the overall
performance of the economy in the United States between 1985-90
was fairly strong in terms of job creation, GDP growth, low
unemployment, and inflation. Although the United States lagged
behind Japan in almost all measures of economic performance, it
had greater employment growth and lower unemployment than most
other OECD countries. The ability to accommodate real wage
declines, rapid growth in employment and falling unemployment
have often been cited as signals of the greater flexibility of the labor
market in the United States compared to other OECD countries.
Despite the fairly strong aggregate performance of the
economy, the cyclical shifts in demand at the beginning and end of
the decade interacted with relative demand shocks within a number
3of industries to create a pronounced imbalance in the economic
performance across regions of the economy Unemployment rates
varied substantially across states at both ends of the recent
expansion. While some states had rates less than half the national
average, others had double digit unemployment rates for most of the
decade.
These imbalances in regional growth raise questions about the
flexibility of the labor market in the United States. Flexibility in this
paper is taken to mean the sensitivity or speed of adjustment of labor
markets to changes in market conditions. Because tests of this type
of flexibility in the labor market at the aggregate level are likely to
have little power, I investigate the labor market response to demand
shocks at the regional level. I focus on two regional adjustment
mechanisms: 1) Relative wage changes; and 2) Worker movement or
migration to other regions of the country. The flexibility of the labor
market will be reflected in the extent to which these factors adjust.
Clearly, flexibility along these dimensions will have implications for
the persistence of differences in regional unemployment rates, so I
also examine the sensitivity of regional unemployment rates to
4demand shifts.
I contrast the adjustment process in the United States with
that of Japan, a country whose aggregate performance dominated the
United States and which is often thought to have a labor market
characterized by extreme flexibility. In particular, I examine the
extent and persistence of regional imbalance in Japan and whether
unemployment, wages, and migration are more sensitive to demand
shifts. Such a comparative analysis may yield insights into the roles
of various government policies or institutions in affecting the speed
and extent of market flexibility.
Cross country differences in the dynamics of the regional
labor market adjustment process may exist for a variety of reasons.
Differences in preferences could alter labor supply elasticities while
variations in the extent of collective bargaining, regional
concentrations of industries, and government social policies will
influence the speed at which regional adjustments occurs. In the case
of Japan, labor market flexibility is seen as being the product of
government employment policy, the Nenko payment system
(described below), the widespread usage of bonus payments, and
5Life-Time Employment contracts. Thus, an examination of the
nature of differences in how Japanese regional labor markets adjust
could provide some insights into whether alternate policy and
institutional environments generate added flexibility in regional
labor markets.
Previous studies by Montgomery (1992), Hall (1970) and
others have looked at the determinants of the equilibrium structure
of wages, unemployment, or migration across regions in the U.S..
Further, work by Beeson and Montgomery (1993) and Bartik (1989)
have looked at the role of taxes and othergovernment policies aimed
at affecting regional growth. These studies have generally focusedon
only one element of the labor market adjustmentprocess and have
not looked at the relative importance of these competing adjustment
mechanisms. Further, they have not looked at how thisprocess varies
under different institutional settings. Thispaper will contribute to
the literature along both of these dimensions. Given themyriad of
economic and institutional differences between the United States and
Japan, the analysis in this paper is only meant to be suggestive. More
definitive treatments need to endogenize these labor market variables
6and require richer, preferably micro, data.
II. Institutional Details
In doing a comparative analysis it is obviously critical to have
some feel for how labor market institutions differ in the countries
being studied. One of the most commonly cited differences between
Japanese and U.S. labor markets is that in Japan compensation or
wages are set by the Nenko wage system. Under this system pay is
almost exclusively based upon seniority, with the intention of
encouraging worker loyalty and investments in specific human
capital. Further, pay adjustments occur during the Shinto or spring
labor offensive with the major firms setting patterns for smaller
companies to follow. This coordinated wage setting on an aggregate
level is thought to prevent the type of rigidities in wages in the U.S.
that some author's attributed to the presence of long term
overlapping contracts.1
The payment of bonuses is found in almost all Japanese
companies and these bonus payments can account for up 20 percent
of regular cash earnings. Theses bonuses generate a profit sharing
mechanism similar to Weitzman's share payments and are seen as
7providing a substantial degree of wage flexibility. This wage system
facilitates or interacts with the often noted Life—Time—Employment
system to generate a high degree of employment stability and job
tenure.
The stability of Japanese employment has been attributed to
a three prong strategic response on the part of employers. First, short
term profits are sacrificed to avoid the loss of skilled workers with
substantial amounts of firm specific skills. Secondly, firms reduce
the use-of subcontractors or temporary workers so that employment
adjustments are suffered by a periphery or buffer stock of workers
(typically females) and not by the firm's core workers. Thirdly,
workers receive reduced bonus payments, thereby cutting labor costs
and reducing the strain on short term profits.
Abraham and Houseman (1989) find that Japanese employers
are slower than their U.S. counterparts to adjust employment to
output shocks and the magnitude of the adjustment is less. Hours
adjustments in the short and longer term appear to be the same
across the two countries which leads to the conclusion that Japanese
employers use hours adjustments relatively more than U.S. firms.
8Overall, total labor input adjusts less in Japan. Thereis also evidence
of differences in wage and price flexibility between Japan and the
United States. Yoshikawa and Takeuchi (1989) found that the slope
of a standard Phillips curve for Japan is 3.112 but only .611 in the
U.S. This supports the notion of greater wage flexibility in Japan in
response to excess demand, as measured by the unemployment rate.2
Thus, at the aggregate level, there appears to be differences
in the nature and speed of labor market adjustments between Japan
and the U.S. If regional labor markets react in similar fashions to
relative demand shocks in the two countries then one might expect
greater wage flexibility and less unemployment in response to
demand shifts in Japan than in the United States.
Although private sector institutions may explain much of
these differences in labor market dynamics across countries, it is also
conceivable that part of this difference is due to differences in the
nature of government labor market intervention. Although there are
a number of national and local employment programs in both
countries those in the United States tend to be more remedial and
limited in scope. The Humphrey-Hawkins bill in the United States
9and the Employment Measures Law in Japan both charge the
government with the task of maintaining full employment (4% in the
U.S. and 2% in Japan). In the United States the law gives equal
weight to the goal of price stability and there is no mechanism for
implementing the goal in the legislation. In contrast, the Japanese
Ministry of Labour is required to formulate long term Basic
Employment Measures Plans as well as to form and implement short
term Annual Employment Plans. The actual administration of these
programs is done at the national level by the Employment Security
Bureau, at the prefectural level by Employment Security Sections,
and locally by public employment service offices (PESO). In the U.S.
national, state, and local employment policies are generally set
independently with little coordination. State and local areas engage
in a host of independent initiatives inresponse to local conditions
without federal (national) linkages.3
In both countries the public employment service office
provides information on job openings. On the surface it would
appear that the job search assistance rendered in Japanese PESO is
fairly extensive. In 1990, the Ministry of Labour was to begin
10publication of a magazine listing job openings with detailed job
descriptions and to prepare a computerized data base on job seekers
and information on various employer subsidies and other support
systems. However, as in the U.S., the public employment service in
Japan is not widely used. In a recent survey of firms, 30 percent
claimed they never use the PESO. Over half of the firms responded
that they could not get the appropriate types of workers; while
workers consistently complained about the low quality of the jobs
available.
In both countries local public employment offices also serve
to administer the Unemployment Insurance program. In the U.S.,
eligibility and unemployment benefit levels are set at the state level,
while Japan has a national structure. In both countries the
Unemployment Insurance system is financed by a payroll tax on
workers and employers. In Japan, the public employment system
receives money to help both workers and firms, while in the U.S.
money is provided only to workers. Japanese firms can get subsidies
from the Employment Stabilization Fund if they are facing business
fluctuations or if they are located in targeted regions if they agree to
11minimize layoffs and provide retraining. There is alsomoney to help
workers relocate or to get firms to locatenew plants in depressed
areas.
In both countries the government provides additionalmonies
to ease the labor market impact of import competitionor structural
shifts. In the U.S., the Trade Adjustment AssistanceAct (TAA)
provides training and supplementalunemployment benefits to
workers who are unemployed because of imports.4The retraining
component of this program, however, was rather limitedas less than
10 percent of the benefit recipients receivedretraining or placement
assistance.5 Despite recent revisions inthe law it remains the case
that displaced workers are onlyencouraged and not required to enter
training programs.
In the U.S. there are also state leveltraining and placement
assistance programs for displacedworkers and several states have
implement advanced notice provisionsto insure that workers get
prior notice of plant closures.Finally, states and local areas often
give property andcorporate tax abatements as incentives for firms
to locate or remain in theirarea. These local initiatives have had
12limited success and it remains true that the vast majority or states
have no formal programs for retraining or assisting displaced
workers or firms.
The structure pf Unemployment Insurance benefits also
differs across these two countries. In Japan, experienced workers
receive benefits of between 60-80 percent of their basic daily wage
(which excludes bonus payments) when they become unemployed.
This exceeds the typical replacement rate in the U.S. of 40—50
percent. In both countries workers in high unemployment areas can
get extended benefits. Two potentially important differences
between Unemployment Insurance in Japan and the U.S. are the fact
that a worker in Japan who gets reemployed quickly or who is in a
training program receives extra benefits.6
Overall, there are a plethora of government programs in both
countries which are all designed to help the unemployed. The focus
on employment stabilization and the regional component of many of
the Japanese programs would lead one to expect less regional
dislocation in Japan. The relocation and retraining benefits should
reduce mobility costs within and across local labor markets. Thus,
13the structure of private and public institutions in Japan would lead
one to expect greater flexibility in terms of earnings, unemployment,
and migration.
III. Model
Following Harris and Todaro (1970), Hall (1972), and Roback
(1982) the long run or static equilibrium structure of regional labor
markets depends on the underlying distribution of nontraded goods
(amenities). These amenities may enter the workers utility function
and/or the firm's production function. In equilibrium workers must
be indifferent to all locations, or analogously, expected utility (V) is
constant across areas j:7
(1)V(w*, r; a) =k > 0,''< 0,YB>
where k is the nationally given level of utility, w is effectivewage
rate, rj is the rental price of land in region janda is the value of
local amenities. As in Hall (1972), the effectivewage rate reflects
14expected wage or wages adjusted for the likelihood of being
employed:
(2) =w/l_u)
where the unemployment rate, u, is used to measure the probability
of being employed and w is the real wage rate.
In the long run firms must also be indifferent across
locations, which for firms with constant return to scale production
functions implies that in equilibrium unit costs equal price (assumed
to be unity) in all areas:
(3) C(wt, r; a) =
1 Cs >1,Cr> 0
If local amenities enhance productivity (absence of blizzards) then
C.cO. Hall (1972) argues that both nominal wages and local
unemployment affect employer costs as turnover costs are lower
when the unemployment rate is high.
Equations (1) and (3) can be used to solve for wt and r as
15functions of amenities, given k. The reduced form hedonic wage
equation is thus:
(4) w =f(u,r; a)
Equilibrium in this model need not imply equalization of wages or
unemployment rates across areas. As long as amenities affect
productivity or utilities, there is no reason to expect constant wage
or unemployment rates. Long run market equilibrium is thus
consistent with persistent differences in wages, unemployment rates,
or rental prices. The observed distribution of these factors across
areas need only be conformable With utility and profit equalization
across areas. The correlation between wages and unemployment in
this long run compensating differences model should be positive.
Work by Blanchflower and Oswald (1992), however, suggests that in
a world with efficiency wages this correlation could be negative.
Efficiency wage payments may be lower in areas where the cost of
job lost (unemployment) is high and firmsmay also be hesitant to
locate in high unemployment areas due to inferior services,higher
16taxes, etc. Whether these considerations will dominate is ultimately
an empirical question.
Migration of workers or firms occurs to equalize utility or
unit costs across areas in response to long run shifts in tastes or
technology. If migration is costly (due to transportation, opportunity,
and psychic costs), the instantaneous flow of migrants will be less
than the long run response. We can thus express the migration rate
between regions i and j in any period as a function of wages,
unemployment, rents and amenities in the two areas:
(5)mig1=g(u1,u, w1, w, r1, rj. d; a1, a)
where d1 is the cost of moving between i and j and mig1 is the net
migration rate between these areas.8
In this model migration serves to maintain the long run
spatial equilibrium. In the short run, however, mobility costs may
impede the instantaneous adjustment of labor markets to changing
conditions. Topel (1986) considers such a dynamic model where in
the presence of mobility costs permanent and transitory local demand
17shocks affect migration rates, relative wages, and unemployment
rates. Permanent (or anticipated) shifts in local demand get
arbitraged away by migration, leaving the long run spatial
distribution of wages and unemployment described in the static
models. Transitory (unanticipated) shifts in demand, in the presence
of mobility costs, mean that current values ofwages and
unemployment adjust to local shocks and hence differ from their
long run values. A transitory negative shocks to demand would
reduce wages below long run values and raise unemployment above
its long run values. Thus, a negative correlation between current
wages and current unemployment could exist if mobility costs are
important in the face of transitory demand shifts.9 We now turn to
an empirical analysis of these reduced form spatial labor market
models.
IV. Stylized Facts and Empirical Results
The choice of the geographical unit for a study of regional
labor markets is not clear cut. Using cities or Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (SMSAs) might be preferred as they corresponds
most closely to the area within which agents have good information
18and transportation costs are relatively minor. There are a number of
problems, however, with using SMSAs as the geographical unit of
analysis. First, in the U.S. the boundaries on SMSAs have changed
over time in ways correlated with economic growth. This was
particularly true in 1982 when many growing SMSAs had counties
added to them to reflect the growing linkages across previously
outlying areas. Secondly, some SMSAs extend over state lines (e.g.
New York) so that residents in one part may face a different set of
government policies than those in another part. Toavoid this
problem I use states for my measure of regional labor markets in the
U.S.. Clearly mobility and information issues can be important
within an area the size of a state so the notion that a state represents
a homogenous labor market is false. Where possibleI check the
sensitivity of my results to the choice of geographic unit of analysis.
The 46 prefectures in Japan are also used as they are the
roughly analogous regional concepts to states in theU.S.. Like states
they have fixed geographic boundaries and their own governmental
structure. Although prefectural and municipal governments are
thought to have less autonomy than state and municipal governments
19in the U.S., they do have some independent taxing andspending
authority.10 While grants to local governments from the national
government are a more important source of local spending in Japan,
individuals pay roughly similar proportions of their taxes to local
jurisdictions in the two countries.11
Given the fact that the population of Japan is about 50
percentof the United States while it has only about 4 percent of the
land size, there are substantial differences in theaverage population
density and distance between the regional units in the two countries.
I attempts to standardize regional labor markets by adding controls
for prefecture population and size to some of the Japaneseanalysis.
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent checking the sensitivity of
the Japanese results to the choice of regional labor marketmeasure.
Since migration plays a crucial role in local labor market
adjustments, it is useful to examine the magnitude and patterns of
regional migration in the two countries. Table 2 presents migration
rates for the United States and several other countries. The overall
level of migration in the United States is higher than inJapan and
these other OECD countries. Prefectural mobility inJapan is higher
20than regional mobility in the United Kingdom or county movement
in Sweden, and is comparable to state mobility in the United States
and county movement in the Netherlands. However, when compared
to county migration rates in the U.S., which are more similar in size
to Japanese prefectures, Japanese migration is less than half the U.S.
rate.
Migration may be less in Japan because shocks to the
Japanese economy have been smaller than in the United States.
Further, even if the level of shocks is similar across countries, the
regional distribution of them may be more homogeneous in Japan
that in the United States. As seen in Table 3, the industrial
distribution of employment at the aggregate industry level has
changed much more dramatically in the U.S. than in Japan over the
past 30 years. In Japan, manufacturing's share of employmenthas
remain fairly constant while it has declined markedly in the United
States. Although these number hide within industry movements, they
suggest that part of the difference in the levelof regional labor
market mobility may be due to differences in the size or regional
distribution of shocks in the two countries.
21For migration to help in labor market adjustment it must also
go in the right directions. In Tables 4 and 5areannual net migration
rates for selected prefectures and states in Japan and the U.S.
respectively. The net migration rate for Japan is based on annual
data and is defined as in-migrants minus out-migrants, divided by
beginning of period population. Net migration rates for the U.S. are
annualized values calculated using Census data on the number of
net-migrants over various time intervals divided by beginning of
period population. Overall inter—prefectural migration ratesrange
from 2.6 to 4.1 percent in Japan and there is substantially moregross
than net migration. Even the high unemployment regions of
Hokkaido and Kagoshima had substantial in and out-migration.
These data do show, however, that there have been consistent net
migration flows toward Nara, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures and
away from the Kagoshima and Hokkaido regions during the sample
period. Similar patterns emerge in the U.S. where states like Illinois
and Ohio have had negative net migration for almost 20years.
To look further at this persistence in regional migration rates,
I calculate rank correlation coefficients forarea migration rates.
22These correlation coefficients indicate that regions in Japan appear
to be consistently growing or declining for longer periods of time
than in the U.S..12 Similarly, simple autoregressive estimates of
regional net migrations rates reinforce this conclusion of greater
persistence in regional migration in Japan.13
These results may indicate either slower market adjustments
(perhaps due to higher mobility costs), or that migration is being
driven more by secular factors in Japan. If mobility costs are higher
then other regional labor market variables will need to adjust more.
The autoregressive (AR) structure of relative earnings, employment
growth and unemployment in the two countries gives a simple way
to characterize the behavior of these other labor market variables.
Tables 6 and 7 show simple lagged dependent variable regressions for
unemployment, employment growth, and earnings for Japan and the
United States respectively. It should be noted that because Japanese
data at the prefecture level are at five year intervals, the U.S. results
are also presented using five year lags for comparability. All
variables represent deviations from means. The data used for these
estimates are described in detail in the Appendix.
23The estimates presented in columns (I) of Table 6 for each
variable in Japan, indicate there is substantial persistence even after
five years in all the labor market variables. Unemployment growth
and earnings having lagged coefficients of around .9. For the U.S.,
the estimates in column (I) of Table 7 for each variable again show
evidence of persistence at 5yearintervals, especially in earnings and
unemployment. There appears to be less serial persistence in the U.S.
than in Japan for each of these labor market variables, especially for
employment growth. Nonetheless, high earnings and unemployment
areas appear to remain so for long periods of time in both countries.
The high degree of persistence in regional labor market
variables also shows up looking at the rank correlations of prefecture
or state labor market data. The rank correlations of area earnings are
in excess of .70 in both countrieseven over 15 year intervals.'4 The
•rank correlations of prefectural unemployment in Japan are also over
.90 at 15 year intervals.Although the rank correlations of
employment growth rates in Japan are lower than for earnings or
unemployment, they still exceed .40 at 15 year intervals. In contrast,
the rank correlations ofunemployment and employment growth rates
24in the U.S. drop considerably over 15 years so that in some cases the
rank correlations are even negative. High earnings, unemployment,
and growth areas tend to remain so in Japan while in the United
States the picture is one of greater regional flux.
Simple AR models are suggestive but can not discern whether
this persistence represents the fact the distribution of earnings and
unemployment rates in Japan represents an unchanging equilibrium
distribution generated by the presence of local amenities or whether
migration and mobility are more stilted so that the reaction to shocks
is substantially more protracted than in the U.S.15 Adding
prefecture fixed effects to these regressions takes out the fixed
amenity effects and shed some light on the degree of within area
persistence. In columns (2) of Tables 6 and 7 are these results for
Japan and the U.S. respectively.
In both countries there is substantially less persistence over
time within local markets for all of the labor market variables. There
appears to be no persistence in earnings at 5yearintervals in Japan
while there is still evidence of persistence in the U.S.. Conversely,
there is no evidence of persistence in employment growth or
25unemployment at 5yearintervals in the U.S. while there is some in
Japan. High cross region but low within region persistence in the two
countries is consistent with the presence of a constant equilibrium
structure of wages and unemployment across areas. The fact that
there remains within area differences in persistence may suggest
differences in regional labor market responsiveness in the two
countries.
To explore more systematically the question of whether
wages and unemployment react differently in the U.S. and Japan, I
estimate several variants of equation (4). The parsimonious nature of
the estimated regressions is largely due to data limitations for Japan.
Previous studies by Hyclak and Johnes (1992), Neumann and Topel
(1992), Eberts and Stone (1992), Montgomery (1992), Topel (1986)
and others have estimated regional wag and unemployment models
for the U.S. using a wider variety of controls. Since micro or
individual data is not available for Japan, I concentrated on
estimating a simple Japanese labor market adjustment model and
replicating it to as great as degree as possible using U.S. data. It
should be emphasized that these reduced form estimates suffer from
26endogeneity and hence must be interpreted with caution. Structural
estimation is needed before definitive conclusions can be drawn but
this must wait future research.
Estimates for the Japanese and U.S. regional labor market
model are presented in Tables 8 and 9 respectively. All equations
include fixed effects and time dummies to take out period and
constant area effects. Hsiao (1986) noted that fixed effect models
with lagged dependent variables yield biased estimates unless the
number of time periods is large. Consequently, instrumental variable
estimates are also presented for the earnings (column 3) and
unemployment equations (column 2) in the U.S. and the
unemployment equations (column 2) in Japan. These regressions are
estimated in difference form and used twice lagged values of the
dependent variable as instruments.
In both countries, for all specifications, regional earnings are
inversely related to the level of unemployment. This is contrary to
the findings of Hall but is consistent with international evidence by
Blanchflower and Oswald (1992). Outsider pressures on wage premia
may thus be more important than the compensatingdifferential
27notions suggested by Hall. The estimates also suggest that area
earnings in Japan and the U.S. are significantly affected by area
demand conditions as proxied by the rate of growth of employment.
Prefectural earnings are consistently found to be positively related
to demand (employment) growth while they are negatively related in
the U.S.. The fact that increases in employment growth are
associated with reductions in relative wages was found in Blanchard
and Katz (1992) when they use a sample period similar to the one use
here. It is conceivable that the employment growth measuremay
represent supply shifts and not just area demand effects. As a check
on this I instrumented for demand growth using an estimated of area
demand growth based on national one digit industry growth rates for
Japan and the U.S.. This instrument is similar to that used by Bartik
(1991) for the U.S. and should be a valid measure as long as industry
employment is not too concentrated in a particular state or
prefecture, which at the one digit level is unlikely to be the case.
The qualitative nature of these results do notappear to be sensitive
to the use of these alternate proxies.16
Finally, the extent of area unionism is positively associated
28with area relative wages in both countries. Unfortunately, state level
housing rental prices, cost of living, and vacancy data are not
available for the United States so we can not replicate all of the
results for Japanese labor markets. Overall these results suggest that
relative regional earnings in both countries is sensitive to local
demand conditions, unemployment, as well as the presence
noncompetitive forces like unions.
In accessing flexibility it is important to know if there are
differences in the size or magnitude of the responses of earnings to
these factors. Blanchflower and Oswald (1992) indicate that one
important measure of flexibility is the unemployment elasticity of
earnings. The long run values for this elasticity calculated from
similar specifications (column 1 estimates in Tables 8 and 9) are —.15
for Japan and —.11 for the U.S. 17Theelasticity of earnings with
respect to employment growth are .02 for Japanand -.02for the
U.S.. Thus, the higher persistence in regional earnings in Japan does
not indicate that they are any less sensitive to unemployment or
employment growth than in the U.S..
In the regional unemployment equations for both the U.S.
29and Japan there is evidence that employment growth (or
instrumented employment growth) are negatively and significantly
related to unemployment. Interestingly, despite their positive effects
on relative wages, we find no evidence that unions significantly
increase unemployment rates in either Japan or the U.S.. The key
finding again is that despite the evidence of strong serial persistence
in area unemployment rates in Japan, area unemployment rates are
sensitive to demand shifts in both countries. Nonetheless, the long
run elasticity of unemployment with respect to employment growth
from the estimates in column (2) in the unemployment equations is
.045 in Japan and .27 in the U.S..18 In contrast to the findings for
earnings, unemployment appears to be less sensitive to demand
(employment growth) in Japan than in the U.S..
Given the evidence that demand shifts affect both wages and
unemployment our theoretical model would lead us to expect this to
generate regional migration. To examine the sensitivity of net
migration rates we estimate variants of equation (5)forboth Japan
and the U.S.. The results from estimating these models without and
with region fixed effects are reported in columns (I) and (2) of
30Tables 10 and 11 for Japan and the U.S. respectively.
Workers in both countries tend to migrate to those areas
where employment is growing. Across areas there is no evidence that
area unemployment significantly affect migration in Japan but some
evidence for the importance of unemployment in the U.S.. In the
fixed effect estimates (columns 2) high unemployment in an area
increases out-migration in the U.S. but not in Japan. Regional
earnings do not appear to have much impact on net migration in
either country.
It is possible that the aggregate nature of the migration
equation is obscuring the relationship between migration and income.
Beeson and Montgomery (1993) and others have found such a
relationship using micro data in the U.S.. Matsukawa (1991) presents
estimates of a place-to-place model of migration which allows
migration rates from one area to another to be a function of relative
wages and demand conditions in each area. His results suggest that
income differentials matter in explaining migration behavior in
Japan.
High housing prices also have a significant deterrent effect
31on regional net migration in Japan. The results hold even when area
fixed effects are included. Unfortunately there is no equivalent state
level time series data on average house price series for the U.S..
Beeson and Montgomery (1993), however, estimate a micro logit
migration equation using data from the 1980 Census and find some
evidence that high housing prices have some, albeit insignificant,
effect on migration in the U.S..
The small size of Japan, and the availability of good rail
transport, may mean that Japanese workers are more able to respond
to changing economic conditions by commuting rather than
migration to new areas. The potential importance of commuting
behavior in Japan can be seen by looking at prefectural data on the
ratio of day time to total or night—time population. This ratio, which
will exceed one if there is net commuting to anarea, is presented for
selected prefectures in Table 12. The Tokyo region experiences as
much as 28 percent populationsurge during the day, while Osaka
and Aichi add between 2 and 5percentto their population. On the
other hand Nara, Saitima, and Chiba prefectures haveup to 13
percent of their residents commuting out to jobs. Thus, there appears
32to be substantial amounts of mobility in Japan that may not be
reflected in net migration rates.
The correlation between prefecture commuting and net
migration rates is positive (controlling for area fixed effects),
suggesting that commuting and migrating may be substitutes. To see
if commuting behavior responds to local labor markets variables, the
results from estimating of area commuting equations are presented
in Table 10, where the ratio of daytime to nighttime population is
the dependent variable. In the fixed effects specification (column 2),
the effects of local conditions on commuting are similar to their
effects on net migration. While workers migrate and commute to
high growth areas, area unemployment does not appear to be a
significant deterrent to either commuting or migrating. Although
wages do not appear to affect net migration, workers seem to
commute to areas with high relative wages holding distance and
demand constant.
V. Summary and Discussion
In this study I have examined regional labor market behavior
in Japan and the United States. In contrast to the picture at the
33aggregate level, Japanese regional labor markets appear to exhibit
substantially more persistence than their U.S. counterparts. Relative
wages, unemployment rates, net migration, and employment growth
rates all show substantial persistence both in terms of the level and
ranking of areas. Within prefecture persistence is less for all these
labor market variables suggesting a fairly constant spatial labor
market structure but fluid within area markets.
In the United States there is evidence of persistence in both
the ranking and level of these labor market indicators, although it is
less than Japan. The most noticeable difference in the two countries
is that there is very little correlation in area unemployment rates in
the U.S. over ten year intervals while it remains high in Japan. The
within state persistence of the labor market variable for the U.S. is
less than the across area persistence but is higher than in Japan.
Estimates of reduced form area earnings and unemployment
equations suggest that broadly speaking regional labor markets in the
two countries respond to similar factors. In contrast to the
predictions of the Harris and Todaro (1970) compensating
differential model, area earnings and unemployment rates are
34negatively correlated in both countries. This seems supportive of the
efficiency wage considerations outlined in Blanchflower and Oswald
(1992) is which worker wage premia are reduced in areas where the
costs of job loss are great. To further test between these models it
would be useful to distinguish between the effects ofpermanent
versus transitory shifts in unemployment on earnings. Further,
aggregation bias may have important effect here, as has been found
in studies of the behavior of wages over the business cyclical.
There was evidence of some important differences in labor
market behavior in the two countries. First, employment growth
seems to be positively correlated with area earnings in Japan but
negatively correlated with earnings in the U.S.. This may suggest that
regional employment growth differences we±e primarily supply
driven in the U.S. but demand driven in Japan. Second, the long run
unemployment elasticity of earnings is slightly lower in the U.S. than
in Japan. Conversely, regional unemployment in Japan is less
sensitive to employment growth than in the U.S..
Net migration rates are substantially higher in the United
States than in Japan. Migration flows in Japan, however, are more
35persistent than in the U.S. and are not sensitive to area
unemployment rates. Despite these differences, net migration flows
in both countries respond to employment growth and wages in
roughly similar fashions. There is some evidence that high housing
prices have an important adverse effect on net migration in Japan
while they do not appear to have a significant effect in the U.S..
Perhaps because of high housing prices commuting serves as a
substitute for net migration in Japan.
This study finds only mixed evidence that regional labor
markets in Japan are more fluid than in the U.S.. The lack of
response in regional unemployment rates may reflect a greater
regional homogeneity in demand shifts in Japan. Alternatively, if the
valuation of location specific amenities (such as being near Tokyo)
are rising faster over time in Japan than in the U.S., this could
generate what appears to be a more limited regional response to short
run demand shifts. Conclusions about the importance of government
regional aid and relocation policies based on this analysis must be
tentative at best. Nonetheless, this study finds no evidence to support
the conclusion that these policies succeeded in making regional
36unemployment rates in Japan more flexible than in the U.S.. Whether
these same policies would have a pronounced effect in aneconomy
with a different regional distribution of amenities remains anopen
question.
37DATA APPENDIX
Description of United States Data
The U.S. data on wages, unemployment, and employment
were provided by the INFORUM reseach group at the University of
Maryland and are available via Internet.
Employment
The measure of employment isthe establishment-based
nonagricultural employment series from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The data range is from 1970-90. Employment
growth rates are calculated as differences in the log of employment
in periods t and t-l.
Unemployment
The measure of state unemployment is from BLS Employment and
Earnings. The data range is from 1976-90.
Wages
The measure of wages used is the BLS establishment based average
hourly earnings of manufacturing production workers from
Employment and Earnings. The data range from 197 1-90.
38Union
The unionization measure is taken from CPS estimates of thepercent
of employment in each state that is covered by a union contract. The
data are from Curme, Hirsch, and Macpherson (1990) and
Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985). The data range from 1976-88.
Data for 1982 is derived from fitting a linear trend between the 1981
and 1983 series values.
39Net Migration
There are two measures of net migration for the U.S.. One uses state
level population from the Statistical Abstract, Bureau of Census,
1989. The data range from 1976-90. Population growth rates are
calculated as differences in the log of state population in periods t
and t— I. The second measure is Census estimates of state level
number of net migration for the time interval 1987-80, 1970-80, and
,1960-70.The number of net migrants was divided by beginning of
period population to get a net migration rate and the annualized.
Description of Japanese Data
Wages are defined as average monthly contractual cash
earnings per employee. The data are from establishments with more
than 30 employees and are available for 46 prefectures (47 when data
on Okinawa are available) every five years from 1970-85 in Annual
Survey on the Wage Structure, Ministry of Labour, Japan.
Employment and Unemployment data are from the Labour
Force Survey, Ministry of Labour, Japan. Unemployed persons are
those over 15 years old who were able to, wanted to work, and
sought work actively. Employment growth is calculated as the
40average annual change in the number of persons at work and those
with a job but not at work. The data for 46 prefectures (47 when
data on Okinawa are available) are availableevery five years from
1960-85.
Distance is the number of kilometers the capital of each
prefecture is from the Tokyo.
The following Japanese data were all taken from the
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Labour Statistics and Research
Department, Ministry of Labour, Japan.
Union is a measure of prefectural unionization based ona
weighted average of one—digit industry unionization rates where the
weights are the share of prefectural employment that is in that
industry. Data are available for 1970, 1975, 1979, and 1988.
Net Migration is defined as the difference between the
number of immigrants to a prefecture and the number of out-
migrants from that prefecture divided by initial population. Data are
available by prefecture annually from 1960-88.
Vacancies are defined as the ratio of monthly average active
openings to active applications for persons registered at Public
41Employment Security Offices. The data by prefecture are available
for 1970, 1980, 1985.
Night-time and Day-Time Population are taken from the
Population Census. Night-time population is the number of residents
of each prefecture. Day-time population is calculated by subtracting
from the night-time population of each prefecture the difference
between the number persons (15 years of age and over) in each
prefecture who are employed or attend school in another prefecture
and those who reside in another prefecture but are employed or go
to school there. Data are available by prefecture every five years for
1970-85.
CPI is a measure of relative cost of living differences. It is
based on the Regional Difference Indexes of Consumer Prices which
measures relative cost of living (Japan=l00) for prefectural capital
cities. The data are available annually for 1971-85.
Rent is defined as the average rental cost per month (in yen)
of privately owned houses. The data are available annually from
1970-89 based on the Retail Price Survey.
42Bibliography
Abraham, Katharine, and Susan Houseman. 1989. "JobSecurity and
Work Force Adjustment How Different AreU.S. and Japanese
Practices?". Journalof theJapanese and International Economies.
3:500-521.
Bartik, Timothy. 1991. Who Beiief its From State and LocalEconomic
Development Policies?, W.E. Upjohn Institute.Kalamazoo, MI.
_______________________1989."The Effects of Demand Shockson
Local Labor Markets", memo. W.E. UpJohn Institute,Kalamazoo, MI.
Beeson, Patricia and Edward Montgomery. 1993. "The Effectsof
Colleges and Universities on Local Labor Markets".Review of
Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
Bj6rklund, Anders and Bertil Holmlund. 1989. "JobMobility and
Subsequent Wages in Sweden". in Migration and LaborMarket
Adjustment, edited by Jouke Van Dijk, HendrikFolmer, Henry
Herzog and Alan Schlottman. Kluwer Academic Publishers. The
Netherlands. 201-216.
Blanchard, Olivier Jean and Lawrence Katz. 1992."Regional
Evolutions", Brookings Papers on EconomicActivity. 1:1-75.
Blanchflower, Daniel and Andrew Oswald. 1992. "InternationalWage
Curves", unpublished memo. Dartmouth University.
Curme, Michael, Hirsch, Barry and David Macpherson. 1990. "Union
Membership and Contract Coverage in the United States, 1983-88".
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 44:5-33.
43Eberts, Randall and Joe Stone. 1992. Wage and Employment
Adjustment in Local Labor Markets. W.E; UpJohn Institute.
Kalamazoo, MI.
Gabriel, Stuart, Shack-Marquez, Janice, and William Wascher. 1991.
"Regional Labor Markets, Cost-of-Living Differentials, and
Migration". working paper 91. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve. Washington, D.C.
Hall, Robert. 1972. "Turnover in the Labor ForceTM. Brookings Papers
onEconomicActivity.3:709-764.
_________________1970."Why is the Unemployment Rate so High
at Full Employment?". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 2:369-
402.
Harris, J.R. and M.P. Todaro. 1970. "Migration, Unemployment, and
Development: A Two-Sector Analysis". American Economic Review.
60: 126-42.
Hashimoto, Masanori. 1990. The Japanese Labor Market in a
Comparative Perspective with the United States. W.E. Upjohn
Institute. Kalamazoo, MI.
Hsiao, Cheng. 1986. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University
Press. Cambridge, England.
Hughes, Gordon and Barry McCormick. 1989. TMDoes Migration
Reduce Differentials in Regional Unemployment Rates?", in
Migration and Labor Market Adjustment. edited by Jouke Van Dijk,
Hendrik Folmer, Henry Herzog and Alan Schlottman. Kiuwer
Academic Publishers. The Netherlands. 85-108.
Hyclak, Thomas and Geriant Johnes. 1992. Wage Flexibility and
Unemployment Dynamics inRegionalLabor Markets. W.E. Upjohn
Institute. Kalamazoo, MI.
44Kokkelenberg, Edward and Donna Sockell. 1935. "L.Jnion
Membership in the United States, 1973-8 1". Industrial and Labor
Relations Review. 38:497-543.
Ito, Takatoshi. 1992. The Japanese Economy. MIT Press.Cambridge, MA.
Leigh, Duane. 1989. AssistingDisplaced Workers. W.E.Upjohn
Institute. Kalamazoo, MI.
Matsukawa, Isamu. 1991. •1lnterregional Gross Migration and
Structural Changes in Local Industries". Environment andPlanning A. 23:745-756.
Montgomery, Edward. 1992. "Evidence on Metropolitan Wage
Differentials Across Industries and Over Time". Journalof Urban
Economics. 31:69-83.
__________________________and Kathryn Shaw. 1985. "Long-Term
Contracts, Expectations and Wage Inertia". Journal ofMonetary
Economics.16:209-226.
Neumann, George and Robert Topel. 1991. "Employment Risk,
Diversification, and Unemployment". Quarterly Journal of
Economics.106:1341-1366.
Roback, Jennifer. 1982. "Wages,Rents, and the Quality of Life".
Journal of Political Economy. 90:1257-78.
Tachibanaki,Toshiaki and Kojiro Sakurai. 1990. "Labour Supply and
Unemploymentin Japan". memo. Kyoto Institute of Economic
Research. Kyoto, Japan.
Topel, Robert. 1986."Local Labor Markets". Journal of Political
Economy.94:S111-SI 43.
45Weir, Margaret. 1992. Politics of Jobs: The Boundaries of
Employment Policy in the United States. Princeton University Press.
Princeton, NJ.
Yoshikawa, Hiroshi, and Yoshiyuki Takeuchi. 1989. "Real Wages and
the Japanese Economy". Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic
Studies. 7:1-40.
46ENDNOTES
1. For a more detailed discussion and analysis of the
Japanese labor market see Hashimoto (1990). Montgomery and
Shaw (1985) show that long—term contracting is of limited
importance for aggregate wage flexibility.
2. Although the there is greater flexibility in response to
unemployment changes there is actually less responsiveness in
Japan to output changes. The slopes of the implied AS curves are
.084 in Japan vs. .227 in the U.S. respectively. This difference
comes from the fact that unemployment does not vary much over
the cycle because labor force participation in Japan is strongly
procyclical. As noted in Yoshikawa and Takeuchi (1989) and
Tachibanaki and Sakurai (1990), unemployment may not be as
good an indicator of labor market conditions in Japan as in other
OECD countries. Labor supply, particularly female labor supply,
falls substantially during downturns with the result that measured
unemployment does not rise as much. Yoshikawa and Takeuchi
(1989) suggest that this effect is over 6 times as big in Japan as in
the U.S.
473. See Leigh (1989) for a discussion of these programs.
4. See Weir (1992) for a further discussion of employment
policy, in the United States.
5.SeeLeigh (1989) for a further description of displaced
worker programs in the U.S..
6. If a workers was eligible for 90 days benefits and used
less than 45hewould get 30 days benefits as a bonus. If he were
eligible for 300 days benefits and used less than 100 he would get
a bonus of 120 days.
7. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile and
unaffected by amenities. Thus, the rate of return is equalized
across areas and can be omitted from the expression.
8. Migration will depend on the relative values of
unemployment, wages, and rents in the two areas but it need not
be the case that the effects are symmetric. Previous research has
rejected the restriction of symmetry or that it is only the
difference in the values of these variables that determines
migration (Hughes and McCormick 1989).
489. Thanks to Andrew Oswald for bringing this point to the
authors attention.
10.Ito(1992) Chapter 6.
ii. Grants account for 20 percent of the national budget in
Japan versus 12 percent in the U.S. and 43 percent of individual
taxes went to state and local governments in the U.S. in 1987 while
36 percent went to prefectural and municipalgovernments in
Japan. See Ito (1992) for a further discussion of fiscal policy in
Japan.
12. These results are available from the authorupon
request.
13. The coefficients on net migration lagged fiveyears
were .451 and .001 for Japan and .262 and -.543 for the U.S. in
autoregressive regressions without and with area fixed effects.
14. These results are available upon request.
15. These conclusions for the United States are not the
result of using states as the measure of regional labor markets. The
rank correlations across SMSAs for these series areremarkably
similar to those for states. Further, the conclusions aboutconstant
49relative wages structure are if anything strengthened if per capita
personal income is used instead of wages as the measure of
compensation.
16. These results are available from the author upon
request.
17. In specifications using lagged once values of the
dependent variable the elasticities with respect to unemployment
and employment growth for the U.S. are -.19 and -.003
respectively. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate this
specification for Japan.
18. The elasticity using once lagged values of the
dependent variable for the U.S. is .28.
50TABLE 1
SELECTEDCOMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STATISTICS
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES 1985-90
U.S. Janan U.K. Germany Canada
Real GDP 2.74.73.2 3.1 3.0
Growth
Inflation Rate 4.31.46.7 2:2 4.9
Employment 2.01.62.0 1.9 2.4
Growth
Employment
Growth 1980-901.9 130.7 0.8 1.9




Growth 2.73.97.1 4.0 53
Sources: International Comparisons of Hourly
Compensation Costs for Production Workers
in Manufacturing. 1975-90. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1991, Comparative Labor Force
Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1991
and Economic Report of the President.
1992. The data use U.S. concepts for labor
force statistics.TABLE 2
SELECFED INTERNAL MIGRATION RATES
BY COUNTRY
U.S. U.K. Netherlands Japan Sweden
Between Regions 2.11.01
Between States3.09
Between 6.55 3.0 2.913
Counties/Prefectures
Note:U.K. and U.S. are from Hughes and McCormick
(1989), Gabriel, Shack-Marques and Wascher
(1991), Japanese Bureau of Statistics, Björkland
and Hoimlund (1989) and Dijk, Folmer, Herzog,
and Schlottman (1989). There are 9 census
regions in the U.S. and 10 regions in the U.KTABLE 3
PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY
Japan
Industry 1960 1980 19891960 1980 1989
Agriculture 30109 943
Mining 1<1 <1 1 1 1
Construction 6 109 555
Manufacturing22 25 2428 2217
Transportation 676 755
Trade 202322 192223
Finance --26 46 6
Services 131821 12 1924
Government 343 14 1716
Note:Numbers may not add to 100 because of
rounding.
Source: Management and Coordination Agency,
Labor Force Survey 1989 and Economic
Report of President, 1992.TABLE 4














Note:Data on migration are described in the
Appendix.TABLE 5













Note:Data on migration rates are described in the
Appendix.TABLE 6







Constant .031 -.828-.017 432-.006 .855
(.09)(.05)(.06) (31)(.12) (.44)
Dependent
Variable .926 -.007.971 .208.701 .439
Lagged Five (.03) (.02)(.03) (.05)(.03) (.05)
Time -.009 .0004.002 -.0233x105 -.005
(.03)(.07)(.01) (.01)(.03) (.03)
.89.99 .80.89 .67.71
N 139 139278 278231 231
Note:Estimates of univariate equations use data
described in the Appendix. Periods of
estimation are 1970-85 for earnings, 1960-85 for
employment, and 1955-85 for unemployment.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Column (2)
estimates include prefecture fixed effects. AU
variables are deviations from national means.TABLE 7
UNIVARIATE MODELS OF RELATIVE WAGES,
UNEMPLOYMENT AND
EMPLOYMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES
Log
Log Wages Unemployment Employment
Change
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -.044 -.020 -.036 -.685.0009 .001
(.006)(.01)(.29) (.39)(.002)(.005)
Dependent
Variable .873.189 .532 -.199.059-.174
Lagged Five (.01)(.04) (.04) (.04)(.03)(.03)
Time .003.0008 .004 .005 -7x105 -8x10'
(.0004) (.0004) (.03) (.02) (.0002) (.0002)
.88.92.26.74 .01 .21
N 703703 499499735 735
Note:Estimates of univariate equations use data
described in the Appendix. Periods of
estimation are 1971-90 for average weekly
manufacturing earnings, 1976-90 for
unemployment and 1970-90 for employment
growth. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Column (2) estimates include state fixed effects.
All variables are deviations from national means.TABLE 8
RELATIVE PREFECTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND




(1) (2) (3) (1)(2)








Variable .001 .857 -1.1.3
Lagged Five(.02) (.14) (.58)
Prefectural Vacancy -.118.082.069 -1.15
Rate (.08)(.10)(.08) (.48)
Prefectural 3.024.66-5.04 -7.44





.99 .99 .94 .97.22
N 139 139139 13992
Notes:Data are for described in the Appendix. All
equations include prefecture rued effects and
time dummies controls. Column (2) for
unemployment includes instrumental variable
estimates for the lagged dependent variable.TABLE 9
RELATIVE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGE




(1) (2)(3) (1) (2)
Constant 3.424.91 -1.694.82-.923
(1.24) (33) (.12)(.56)(.26)
Log Employment -.475-.177 -2.63-33.01 -5033









N 682563318 399 149
Notes:Data are described in the Appendix. All
equations include prefecture fixed effects and
time dummies controls. Column (2) for
unemployment and column (3) for earnings
include instrumental variable estimates for the
lagged dependent variable.TABLE 10
PREFECTURAL NET MIGRATION RATE AND
COMMUTING EQUATIONS FOR JAPAN
Annual Net Migration Day-Time/Night-Time
Rate Populations
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -.028 -366 .923.776
(.01) (.08) (.06)(.14)
Log
Employment .006 .009 -.026.006
Change (.001)(.001) (.004)(.002)
Unemployment
Rate .0005 .003 .003.001
(.0006)(.001) (.004)(.002)
Log Monthly .001 .001 .006-.005
Earnings (.001)(.001) (.005)(.002)
Vacancy Rate.003 .006 .022-.001
(.001)(.001) (.008)(.002)
Housing
Rental -2x10'-3x104 -7x104 6x104
Prices (li10)(1x104) (-8x104) (2x10)
Distance from -3x104.0004 1xiO .0003
Tokyo (-2xlff')(.0001) (2x104) (.0002)
.62 .87 .26 .98
N 139 139 139 139
Notes:Columns (2) include prefecture fixed effects
and time dummies. Data used are described in
he Appendix.TABLE 11
STATE NET MIGRATION EQUATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
Annualized
Log Population Net Migration
Change Rate
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant .027 .018 -.026-.036
(.01) (.05) (.02) (.01)
LogEmployment.213 .197 .307.013
Change (.02) (.02) (.03)(.013)
Unemployment .0004 -.002 .002-.0008
Rate (.0002)(.0003)(.0005) (.0002)
Log Weekly Wage -.003 .006 .004 .007
(.002)(.008) (.004)(.002)
State Unionization -.0002-.0001 -.0006 -.00002
(.0001)(.0001)(.0001) (.0001)
.25 .74 .15 .94
N 585 585 536 536
Note:Data are described in the Appendix. Columns
(2) include state fixed effects and time dummies.TABLE 12













Note:Ratio of day population/total population.